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EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION--1982 OVERVIEW 
BY CLARENCE R. ALLEN 
ABSTRACT 
Short-term earthquake prediction represents a more difficult scientific prob- 
lem than most of us thought 5 yr ago when the National Earthquake Hazards 
Reduction Program commenced, and our progress has not been as rapid as 
initially hoped. At this point, reasons can be cited for both encouragement and 
discouragement. Despite slow progress, the goal of short-term prediction re- 
mains realistic, and research should continue vigorously, albeit with some 
changes in scientific strategy. In contrast, progress in long-term prediction and 
hazard evaluation has been far more rapid than initially envisaged. 
It has now been 5 yr since the passage of the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act 
of 1977 and since the formal commencement of he American earthquake-prediction 
program. This is, therefore, a logical time to review our progress in prediction, and 
we would, in fact, be negligent if we did not periodically assess our progress and 
modify our strategy as called for. 
In my opinion, we must face up to the fact that our progress during the past 5 yr 
in short-term earthquake prediction has not been as rapid as we had envisaged when 
the program started. On the other hand, our progress in long-term prediction and 
hazard evaluation has been more rapid than expected. Not everyone agrees with 
this assessment, of course, nor did everyone have the same expectations 5 yr ago. 
Some researchers vigorously defend our allegedly rapid progress in short-term 
prediction, but there are also thoughtful scientists who have now concluded that 
routine short-term prediction represents a goal that is virtually unattainable within 
the foreseeable future. I seem to stand somewhere in the middle. 
Granting that our progress has been somewhat slower than expected, can we 
blame the shortage of funds? Clearly, we could have done much more if additional 
funds had been available, and certainly those of us who have served on proposal- 
review panels can testify to the many very promising proposals that have been left 
unfunded. Programs in other countries, such as that in Japan, have been far more 
generously supported. But I think that we cannot blame inadequate funding alone; 
the short-term prediction problem has simply turned out to be a more difficult 
problem than many of us visualized 5yr ago. 
One can point out a number of reasons for both encouragement and discourage- 
ment. Consider the discouraging aspects first. 
1. A number of the proposed prediction techniques that looked so promising 5yr 
ago, such as the VJVs method, have not proved to be as effective as hoped. 
Indeed, a certain euphoria of imminent victory pervaded the earthquake- 
prediction community 5 yr ago, primarily based on this and other proposed 
prediction techniques, and this euphoria has by now largely evaporated. 
2. It was said 5 yr ago that what we really needed to implement the prediction 
effort in California was one or two moderate-sized arthquakes in areas of good 
instrumentation; i.e., we needed to "trap" a significant event. Two such events 
have in fact recently occurred--the 1979 M = 5.9 earthquake near Gilroy, and 
the 1979 M = 6.6 earthquake near E1 Centro. While neither of these arthquakes 
$331 
$332 CLARENCE R. ALLEN 
occurred within a network with instrumentation as dense as we would like, 
certainly the instrumentation i both areas was far higher than we have 
generally had in the past. Both of the earthquakes are still being intensively 
studied, but it seems fair to observe that no plethora of precursors has been 
claimed. Indeed, some of the results have been downright discouraging. For 
example, prior to the 1966 Parkfield earthquake on the San Andreas fault, 
obvious creep took place along the fault in the days and weeks just prior to the 
event, and with this in mind, several continuously recording creepmeters were 
placed across the Imperial and Brawley faults in 1975. Three of these instru- 
ments crossed the fault trace that broke in 1979 and recorded the coseismic 
displacement, but none of the three creepmeters showed any hint of precursory 
creep during the minutes, hours, or days preceding the earthquake. 
3. One of the significant results of seismological research during the past few 
years has been the discovery that earthquakes are vastly more different from 
one to another in their mechanical parameters than we had ever suspected-- 
differences in stress drops, absolute stresses, rupture velocities, rupture pat- 
terns, etc. While these discoveries are significant and exciting from the point of 
view of fundamental seismology, they are not particularly good news from the 
point of view of earthquake prediction. It seems logical that the more different 
earthquakes are from one to another, the less likely it is that they will have 
common precursors. 
4. Increasingly, studies of large earthquakes indicate that they typically are 
multiple events--a series of earthquakes of increasing size which successively 
trigger one another along a given fault zone. Thus, the prediction problem for 
such complex events is not so much that of predicting the integrated large 
earthquake as it is that of predicting which small earthquake will be the trigger 
that starts the sequence. Which straw will break the camel's back? Inasmuch 
as it is these largest and most damaging earthquakes that we are primarily 
interested in predicting, the triggering phenomenon certainly makes the pre- 
diction problem a more difficult one. 
On the other hand, the past few years have also given us some reasons for 
encouragement. 
1. Some earthquakes have been successfully predicted on scientific bases, and 
these successes obviously give cause for optimism. Perhaps the most widely 
recognized of these is the Haicheng, China, earthquake of 1975, and although 
a certain amount of good luck may have been involved, most independent 
observers have concluded that a real scientific basis existed for the prediction. 
If we can succeed on some earthquakes, we should be able to succeed on others. 
2. Convincing physical precursors to many earthquakes have, in fact, been ob- 
served, and although these precursory phenomena have not always led to 
predictions, they breed optimism that prediction is a realistic scientific objec- 
tive. Examples might include: the fault creep prior to the 1966 Parkfield, 
California, earthquake; the distinct seismicity pattern preceding the 1978 
Oaxaca, Mexico, earthquake; and the many credible reports of ground-level 
and well-water changes prior to historic Japanese arthquakes. Perhaps a bit 
more debatable are the reported radon anomalies prior to the 1976 Gazli, 
USSR, earthquake, and the dilatometer-recorded Strain changes prior to the 
1978 Izu-Oshima, Japan, earthquake. Furthermore, of course, foreshocks are a 
very real precursory phenomenon, whether or not we can as yet always 
recognize them as such. 
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3. Distinct temporal changes in physical parameters that must be related to the 
earthquake process are, in fact, taking place and can increasingly be measured, 
regardless of whether we currently understand their significance. Examples 
include the recent major changes in the level of seismicity and the concomitant 
changes in regional strain patterns in southern California. The fact that such 
changes are demonstrably taking place and can be documented gives encour- 
agement that we shall eventually be able to understand their relationship to 
the mechanical processes preceding earthquake rupture. 
4. The seismic gap concept has by now been verified time and again, and it 
represents a very major contribution to our understanding ofthe strain buildup 
process preceding earthquakes. While primarily utilized thus far in long-term 
predictions, this phenomenon allows us to concentrate our short-term predic- 
tion efforts in promising areas, and gives hope that short-term precursors will 
be found in seismicity patterns within gaps. 
In summary, I would have to characterize our present attitude toward short-term 
earthquake prediction as one of very guarded optimism, as compared to the out- 
and-out euphoria of a few years ago. But in sampling scientific opinion, one must be 
careful to include the viewpoints of seismologists who are not directly involved in 
the program as well as those who are, and who, to a significant degree, have a vested 
interest in its continued funding. 
If progress has been slower than expected in short-term prediction, certainly it 
has been faster than expected in hazard evaluation and long-term prediction. 
Particularly significant in this area has been the development of techniques for 
establishing earthquake recurrence intervals based on geological field relationships, 
as exemplified by the paleoseismicity studies of the southern San Andreas fault in 
California and of the Wasatch fault zone in Utah. Such studies are aiding consider- 
ably in establishing firm probabilistic approaches to hazard evaluation. For long- 
term planning, engineering design, and the development of realistic building codes, 
these results may in fact be far more important han the development of a short- 
term prediction capability. 
It is clear, nevertheless, that "earthquake prediction" implies to most people 
short-term prediction, and that is the focus of the present discussion. It was the 
possibility of short-term prediction that primarily caught he attention of Congress 
in the 1977 legislation. There are, of course, all gradations between short- and long- 
term prediction, and one hears an increasing call to eliminate the semantic distinc- 
tion between the two--partly to capitalize on the success of long-term prediction 
and thus to make the overall program now more sellable. It is my opinion, however, 
that some real changes in strategy are necessary in the effort to achieve a short- 
term prediction capability, and merely changing the semantic umbrella is not 
enough. That is, some fundamental changes in the scientific game plan are called 
for, not merely a redefinition of what we mean by "prediction." Other contributors 
to this symposium will be addressing this specific problem. My one observation, 
based on our experience in California thus far, would be that we should deemphasize 
the widespread placing of instruments all over the state in the hopes of somehow 
trapping a meaningful anomaly, when we do not fully understand either the 
instruments or what it is we are trying to measure. Our efforts in strain, radon, and 
tilt to some degree illustrate this problem. If we are ever to predict earthquakes 
routinely, a better fundamental understanding of many of these phenomena is 
necessary, and I am convinced, albeit in retrospect, that there must be a larger 
basic-research element o our overall earthquake-prediction effort. 
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Quite aside from our degree of success, or lack thereof, in earthquake prediction, 
we have now had some experience in the evaluation of scientific predictions, and 
this has been a traumatic experience for almost everyone involved. I am convinced 
that such a governmental evaluation procedure is necessary, in view of the great 
public impact of prediction statements, but it is certainly unlike the kinds of 
scientific evaluations most of us are used to in normal research activities--those 
involving publication procedures and the peer-review process inherent herein. In 
my 1976 Presidential Address to the Seismological Society of America, I warned 
that the next 10 yr were going to be difficult ones for us, with many "messy" 
predictions to deal with as we gradually developed a prediction capability. Certainly 
this has proved to be the case, with many of the most difficult situations arising 
from predictions by amateurs or self-proclaimed scientists who nevertheless gained 
public credibility through the news media. But truly scientific predictions themselves 
have also already caused serious problems, as evidenced by the so-called Brady- 
Spence prediction for a series of great earthquakes in Peru during the summer of 
1981--a prediction that fortunately turned out to be a false alarm. 
The National Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council formally repudiated the 
Brady-Spence prediction some 5 months before the first predicted event, but, as 
Chairman of that group, I am left with the uneasy feeling that the scientific 
community did not handle this episode as well as we should be able to in the future. 
It clearly represented a very delicate situation, involving freedom of scientific 
expression and the willingness of the scientific "establishment" seriously to consider 
seemingly aberrant points of view, but also involving the economic and social well- 
being of literally millions of people. Was the public (in this case, the citizenry of 
Peru) well served by the scientific community? Should the scientific evaluation 
groups have acted sooner and more positively to renounce the prediction? Were the 
predictors given adequate and fair opportunities to defend the scientific basis of 
their prediction? Was an open hearing, with the TV cameras rolling, the fairest and 
most effective forum for the scientific evaluation of the prediction? Should the 
Evaluation Council have refused to evaluate the prediction until it was published, 
or at least written in some sort of formal statement? What role should the profes- 
sional societies play in such a circumstance, and, in particular, should they be more 
vigorous in formulating a prediction "code of ethics"? Should the employers of the 
predictors, in this case the U.S. Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Geological Survey, 
have been more active in "controlling" the announcements of their employees? In
our efforts to be professionally fair to the predictors, were we being equally fair to 
the people of Peru? And in this particular case, could not the U.S. State Department 
have played a more stabilizing role in its handling of the prediction and its publicity? 
There are not questions with easy answers, but surely somewhat similar situations 
will arise again, and hopefully we can face them with less overall trauma than with 
the recent Peruvian false-alarm prediction. 
In my 1976 Presidential Address, I also asked: "Will we have the courage to admit 
it to ourselves and to our funding agencies if, after another 2 or 3 years of intensive 
effort, it turns out that our initial enthusiasm was unwarranted and that there really 
isn't much hope of routinely predicting earthquakes within the foreseeable future?" 
Our initial enthusiasm ay indeed have been a bit naive, but I remain convinced 
that the objective is realistic. It would make no more sense to abandon the 
earthquake-prediction effort now, particularly with much of our critical instrumen- 
tation just getting into place, than it would be to abandon the "war on cancer" just 
because the ultimate objective has not yet been reached. But let us continue to be 
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honest with our funding agencies, Congress, and the public. To some degree, we in 
the seismological community have been guilty of allowing the public to conclude 
that short-term earthquake prediction is more imminent than most of us really 
believe. 
There is no firm guarantee that we will ever routinely predict damaging earth- 
quakes on a short-term basis, and the scientific difficulties are clearly formidable. 
Everyone acknowledges this. But, in my opinion, the chances of success are high 
enough that we must vigorously continue the program--albeit with possible changes 
in strategy as the effort moves forward. The potential payoff--both scientifically 
and socially--is till very great. 
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